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Abstract 
Economic studies have demonstrated, both empirically and theoretically, that higher levels of 
human development (HD) and economic freedom (EF) are associated with lower levels of 
perceived corruption.  This study separately examines the impact of human development and 
economic freedom on perceived levels of corruption across more than one hundred countries 
using a novel approach that greatly reduces multicollinear bias in the model. The results from 
this study confirm that both HD and EF are significant predictors of corruption perception levels. 
Furthermore, an increase in either HD or EF corresponds to a reduction in corruption perception. 
When evaluated separately, however, increases in human development are shown to correspond 
to greater reductions in corruption perception than economic freedom. This is demonstrated with 
an OLS regression using data collected from a single year and a number of panel estimates that 
utilize data from multiple years. 
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Introduction 
Despite increased attention, corruption, generally defined as the abuse of political office 
or public positions of trust for private gain, is not unique to modern systems of government.1  
According to Vito Tanzi (1998), literature on corruption has been documented as far back as 
2,000 years.  In all likelihood, the first discourse on corruption accompanied the emergence of 
the first state or institution.  Although corruption is typically associated with unscrupulous 
behavior and dishonesty, several arguments supporting corruption in limited circumstances have 
appeared in economics literature.  Most of these arguments rest on the claim that ‘efficiency-
enhancing’ effects may accompany corruption and facilitate economic growth in certain 
circumstances (Serguey Braguinsky, 1996).2  Support for the view that corruption has a positive 
impact on economic growth, however, has been replaced with the view that the effects of 
corruption are negative (Arthur Goldsmith, 1999).3  
Although no objective measurement of corruption exists, various subjective 
measurements, the most common being the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), have made 
exploring the causes of corruption increasingly common.  As a result, both empirical and 
theoretical studies have been undertaken, which support the consensus that the economic 
consequences of corruption are negative, especially for developing countries.  These studies have 
focused on modeling the causes of corruption and suggesting potential solutions.  
                                                        
1 This definition is adopted from Goldsmith (1999). For conceptual discussions of corruption see: M. Shahid Alam 
(1990); Andrew Goudie & David Stasavage (1997); Michael Johnston (1997); Robert Klitgaard (1988); Joseph 
LaPalombara (1994); Joseph S. Nye (1967); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny (1993); and Dionsis Spinellis 
(1996). 
2 Similar claims are also presented in Pranab K. Bardhan (1997); Nathaniel Leff (1964); and Samuel P. Huntington 
(1968). 
3 Also see: Paulo Mauro (1995); and Susan Rose-Ackerman (1999) for an overview of arguments against corruption. 
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Many economists share Gary Becker’s view that the best solution to the corruption 
problem is a reduction in the size and role of government.4  The well-being of any nation, 
however, will be heavily influenced by the quality of its institutions and not simply their relative 
size or regulatory role.  On the one hand, some of the least regulated countries in the world, such 
as Singapore and New Zealand, are among the least corrupt according to Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).  On the other hand, Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden and the Netherlands all hold spots among the least corrupt countries according to the 
CPI yet they have some of the largest relative public sectors in the world.  
Furthermore, these latter countries are among the most developed in the world according 
to the Human Development Index (HDI) created by the United Nations.  While previous studies 
have identified a significant relationship between corruption and economic freedom (EF) only a 
few succeed in modeling a direct relationship between corruption and human development (HD).  
This study seeks to make a novel contribution to the foundation established in previous literature 
through the use of cross-country studies that model the impact of HD and EF on corruption 
perception separately.  In addition, we use a number of econometric specifications to determine 
whether HD or EF is a better predictor of corruption in cross-country examinations.  Finally, this 
paper attempts to determine which of the two has the greatest impact on corruption perceptions.  
 Although several measurements of corruption, development, and economic freedom 
have been used in economics literature, the most popular are Transparency International’s CPI, 
the HDI constructed by the United Nations, and the Economic Freedom Index (EFW) developed 
                                                        
4 See GS Becker, “To Root Out Corruption, Boot Out Big Government,” BusinessWeek, January 31, 1994, p. 18. 
and Gary S. Becker, “If You Want to Cut Corruption, Cut Government,” Business Week, December 11, 1995, p. 26. 
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by the Heritage Foundation.5  This paper seeks to make an empirical contribution to the existing 
literature on corruption by examining the relationship between corruption, development, and 
economic freedom using these indices.  
 
I. Background 
It is almost impossible to create a complete list of the causes and consequences of 
corruption.  Tanzi (1998) offers a comprehensive overview of the growth of corruption in 
modern government, many of its causes, and the associated qualitative and quantitative economic 
costs.  This study distinguishes between direct causes, such as the financing of political parties 
and spending decisions; and indirect causes, such as the quality of government and public sector 
wages.  The author ultimately concludes that, in most circumstances, corruption is an 
institutional problem that is best corrected with government reform.  
In discussions of corruption, the assumption is that a principal-agent relationship exists 
between a government and its public (see Gary S. Becker and George T. Stigler, 1974; Edward 
Banfield, 1975; Susan Rose-Ackerman 1975, 1978; and Robert Klitgaard, 1988).  In corrupt 
nations, those who occupy bureaucratic or political positions frequently abuse this relationship.  
This behavior is often classified as ‘rent-seeking.’  As Anne Krueger (1974) explains, the mere 
existence of rents provides a sufficient incentive for this behavior.  Rents are expected to be 
present in any institutional arrangement.  Nevertheless, certain rents may be easier to extract than 
others.  
                                                        
5 Economic Freedom is essentially defined as an absence of government regulation. The methodology for computing 
the EFW Index consists of 10 specific components of economic freedom: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal 
freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, and freedom 
from corruption. A complete explanation of the methodology can be found at 
http://www.heritage.org/Index/PDF/Index09_Methodology.pdf.  
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According to Paulo Mauro (1997), certain industries are more susceptible to corruption 
than others due to the availability of rents and the barriers in place to prevent rent extraction.  
These findings demonstrate that corruption is associated with a misappropriation of public 
resources from areas such as education and health towards projects like infrastructure investment 
that are less productivity enhancing.  One can hypothesize, for example, that the defense industry 
is therefore more susceptible to corruption than the health or education industries.  A study 
conducted by Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi (1997) supports this claim by showing that public 
funds are often diverted to areas where bribes are easier to collect.  As a result, resources are 
pooled away from the health and education sectors in corrupt countries.  In addition, regression 
analysis has been used to show that more corrupt countries spend less on education and 
healthcare than industries that provide more lucrative opportunities for rent extraction (Mauro, 
1998).  
Theoretical studies have drawn similar conclusions.  Keith Blackburn and Rashmi 
Sarmah (2007), for example, used a dynamic equilibrium model to evaluate the relationship 
between corruption, economic development, and life expectancy.  According to their study, 
increases in life expectancy are part of a demographic transition associated with increases in 
development.  The model they introduce predicts that high levels of corruption are associated 
with low levels of economic development and life expectancy.  
Many economists have explored the relationship between development and measures of 
well being such as public expenditures allocated to health and education.  For example, Lekha 
Chakraborty (2003) used regression analysis to explore the relationship between scores from the 
HDI, social spending and per capita income.  The results showed a strong relationship between 
public expenditures on education and health and the human development index.  This is not 
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surprising, however; measures of health and education are key components in the calculation of 
the HDI.  What is unique about the study is that the relationship between social spending and HD 
was found to be stronger than the relationship between HD and per capita income, which is also 
a component in the calculation of the index.  
Although several studies have identified an indirect link between corruption and some of 
the factors used to gauge HD, an explicit relationship between corruption and the HDI has not 
been explored on a grand scale.  Mozaffar Qizilbash (2001) theoretically examines the 
relationship and concludes that “when the corruption and development debate shifts to a concern 
with human development, the case for thinking that corruption is good for development, in terms 
of its overall consequences, is weakened.”  An empirical study published by Syed Akhter (2004) 
draws similar conclusions, showing that increases in economic freedom and globalization can 
increase human development and mitigate corruption perceptions.  
Selçuk Akçay (2006) explored the direct relationship between human development, 
corruption, and economic freedom.  The regression models used included the economic freedom 
index, three measurements of corruption perceptions, an urbanization measurement, a democracy 
index, and a vector of geographic dummies as independent variables.  The dependent variable in 
this model was the HDI.  The analysis found a significant inverse relationship between 
corruption and human development.  The findings also showed that European Union 
membership has a positive effect on human development.  In addition, African and Latin 
American dummies were shown to have a negative relationship with the HDI.  Unfortunately, the 
analysis was limited to 63 countries and did not model the relationship across multiple time 
periods.   
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Studies have also identified a significant relationship between various measures of wealth 
and corruption perception.  Results obtained by Daniel Triesman (2000), for example, suggest 
that more than 50% of the variation in corruption perceptions can be explained by variations in 
per capita income.  Other studies have documented a significant inverse relationship between 
corruption and wealth using real per capita GDP growth (Mauro, 1996; Carlos Leite and Jens 
Weideman, 2000; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000; and George Abed and Davoodi, 2000).  
Furthermore, according to a cross-country study conducted by Kathleen Getz and Roger 
Volkema (2001), there is a significant inverse relationship between GDP per capita and 
corruption.  This same study also found a significant positive relationship between corruption 
and inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index.  Fahim Al-Marhubi (2000) found a 
positive relationship between corruption and inflation as well.  The study used the Business 
International Corruption Index and the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as corruption 
measurements.  In addition, empirical and theoretical models developed by Miguel Braun and 
Rafael DiTella (2004) have shown a strong relationship between corruption and inflation 
variability.  Their results suggest that high levels of inflation variability can break down the 
principal-agent relationship between government and society and lead to higher levels of 
corruption.  This study also found that high periods of inflation are associated with high levels of 
corruption.  Likewise, Martin Paldam (2002) argues that high levels of inflation are measures of 
economic stability associated with corruption and economic uncertainty. 
Increases in EF or reductions in the role and size of government have been shown to 
correlate with reductions in corruption pereption levels.  Moreover, several studies support the 
claim that extensive regulation is associated with high levels of corruption.  Exploring the pros 
and cons of economic liberalization in less developed countries, Goldsmith (1999) used 
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regression analysis to model a significant relationship between corruption perception and 
economic liberalization, political democratization and administrative centralization.  These 
results also showed a negative correlation between GNP per capita and corruption across 34 low 
and middle-income countries.  A cross-national study using the 1996 CPI dataset from 
Transparency International showed that corruption is higher in countries with more regulation, 
taxation and state intervention in economic affairs (Triesman, 2000).  The same study also found 
a significant inverse relationship between corruption and GDP per capita.6  Studies conducted by 
Alejandro Chafuen and Eugenio Guzman (2000) and Paldam (2002) also support the claim that 
more economic freedom is associated with lower levels of corruption.  Peter Graeff and Guido 
Mehlkop (2003) used Transparency International’s Index to demonstrate a strong relationship 
between EF and perceived corruption in both rich and poor countries as defined by the OECD.  
A recent cross-national study conducted by one of the key individuals associated with the 
development of the EFW Index used regression techniques to explore the relationship between 
economic freedom and corruption across more than 100 countries and discovered a similar 
relationship (James Gwartney, 2009).  The results showed an inverse relationship between 
corruption and economic freedom across countries with diverse institutions and cultures.  In 
addition, a correlation coefficient of 0.76 was found between EF and corruption perceptions.  
 
II. Data 
As illustrated by past studies, higher levels of corruption are associated with lower levels 
of human development, economic freedom, wealth, health and education.  In addition, inflation, 
                                                        
6 In particular, Triesman argues that a tenfold increase in 1990 per capita GDP could lead to a drop in the corruption 
perception rating of more than 4 points.  This drop is quite significant given that the index measures corruption on a 
scale of one to ten.  
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geography, and various political variables have been incorporated into corruption regressions.7  
This study does not incorporate any political measurements as independent variables in the 
regression models presented.  Instead, the independent variables are limited to measures of 
education, health, national wealth, inflation, HD and EF.  In addition, dummy variables are 
included to identify countries located in tropical regions, those with membership in the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and selected countries with 
a history of British rule leading into the twentieth century.  
Corruption is a measure of the level of ‘perceived corruption’ and contains data from 
Transparency International’s CPI.  Although any measure of perceived corruption is inherently 
subjective, previous economic literature supports the use of these measurements.8  The CPI is 
constructed from a “survey of surveys” based on 13 different expert and business surveys of 
perceived public-sector corruption.9  The index ranges from 0 to 10, with a score of 0 
representing a highly corrupt country.  For interpretive purposes, the index has been altered in 
this study by subtracting country values from 10 so that higher values correspond to higher 
corruption perceptions.11   
The HDI contains country-specific measures provided by the United Nations Human 
Development Reports.  A different report has been published every year since 1990.  The HDI 
provided by each report measures human development in five aspects: life expectancy, 
education, adult literacy, GDP per capita, and a gross enrollment index that measures levels of 
                                                        
7 For and overview of the political factors used in corruption studies see Charles Blake and Christopher Martin 
(2006).  
8 For arguments supporting the use of “subjective” measurements of corruption see Triesman (2000) or Mocan 
(2004).  
9 Although several measures of “perceived corruption” exist, Transparency International’s Index is used because it is 
the most widely cited in the literature and provides information on more than one hundred countries for the years 
selected in this study. 
11 Denmark, for example, receives a corruption perception score of 0.6 in 2007 after the adjustment and is the “least 
corrupt” nation in the that sample. This altercation is also used in Triesman (2000) and Akçay (2006). 
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educational attainment.12  Countries are scored from zero to one, with one representing the 
highest level of human development.13  Furthermore, GDP data is taken from the World 
Economic Outlook Database created by the International Monetary Fund.14  GDP figures are 
computed at purchasing power parity per capita in U.S. dollars.  Although many studies have 
used real per capita GDP growth in corruption regressions (Mauro, 1996; Leite and Weideman, 
1999; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000; Abed and Davoodi, 2000) a yearly measure of GDP per capita 
is more appropriate because of the panel studies used in this paper.15  Inflation data in the form 
of the Consumer Price Index for each given country was obtained from the CIA World 
Factbook.16  The Consumer Price Index is expressed as a percentage for each country.  
Therefore, a score of 2 represents an inflation rate of 2%.  Inflation rates in our sample range 
from 0 to 30 in years 2005, 2006 and 2007.17   
Life expectancy and adult literacy data were obtained from the United Nations Statistics 
Division.18  Life Expectancy is measured in years.  Countries with higher life expectancy scores 
are assumed to be healthier countries.  A measurement of life expectancy is used rather than 
public expenditure on health due to the scarcity of reliable data available for large cross-country 
comparisons.   The life expectancy data ranges from a minimum of 41.9 (Sierra Leone in 2000) 
to a maximum of 82.7 (Japan in 2007).  The adult literacy rate is expressed as the percentage of 
                                                        
12 A complete explanation of how the index is calculated can be found here: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/hdi/ 
13  In this study, the scores are multiplied by one hundred for interpretive purposes.  Therefore, a score of one 
hundred indicates maximum human development and a score of zero indicates minimum human development 
although no values actually reach these extremes in any of the models.  Descriptive statistics indicate a mean of 
73.035 and a standard deviation of 17.397.  The minimum and maximum across the entire sample is 25.82 (Niger in 
2000) and 97.11 (Norway in 2007) respectively. 
14 International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm#data 
15 Furthermore, the natural logarithm is used to better capture the relationship between GDP per capita (PPP) and the 
other variables. 
16 CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. 
17 Note that inflation rates were not available for 2000 and are therefore excluded from models concerning year 2000 
data. 
18 United Nations Statistics Division, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm. 
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literate individuals aged 15 and older.19  A measure of adult literacy is used as opposed to a 
measure of public expenditure on education for the same reason life expectancy is used instead 
of a measure of public expenditure on health.   
Finally, this study examines three categorical variables: (1) presence in the tropics; (2) 
membership in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); and (3) 
colonization status.  A value of 1 is assigned if more than half of the country lies between the 
Tropic of Cancer and Capricorn and a value of zero is assigned otherwise.20  A value of 1 is 
assigned to OECD members and a value of 0 is assigned to non-OECD members.21  A value of 1 
is also given to former British colonies if they remained colonies into the 20th century.22  This 
study focuses on former British colonies, because, as a previous cross-national has shown, there 
is something unique about British rule (Triesman 2000).23     
The models presented in this study are based on data obtained from approximately 175 
countries each for the years 2000, 2005, 2006 and 2007 for a total of 700 potential 
                                                        
19 This serves as a proxy for the level of education in the countries, such that a more literate country is assumed to be 
a more educated country.   
20 The use of such a dummy variable appears in Triesman (2000).  After controlling for other exogenous variables, 
he shows that distance from the equator is significantly related to levels of corruption.  The use of a dummy variable 
for tropical climates also appears in a recent study that explores the relationship between economic freedom and 
corruption (Gwartney, 2009). 
21 OECD Members include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United 
States. 
22 Note that only colonies were considered, and not World War I mandates. In addition, Australia, New Zealand and 
the United States are not included. Consequently, list of former colonies included is as follows: Anguilla, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Cameroon, Cyprus, Egypt, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, 
Guyana, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, 
and Zambia are the relevant countries in this study.  
23 In this analysis, other colonial powers such as France, Portugal and Spain were shown to be insignificant 
determinants of corruption perceptions.   
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observations.24  A separate data set was constructed for each year then each individual data set 
was integrated into a master data set of all 700 observations.  A summary of the descriptive 
statistics is presented in Table 1 of the appendix. 
 
 
IV. Econometric Model 
The models presented in this study incorporate independent variables that are highly 
correlated with one another in some circumstances.  Previous studies have demonstrated a 
positive correlation between longevity and development (David Bloom, David Canning, and 
Jaypee Sevilla, 2001; Stephen Knowles and Dorian Owen, 1995; Lant Pritchett and Lawrence 
Summers, 1996), so some level of multicollinearity between HD and life expectancy is expected.  
A positive correlation between income and various measurements of health has also been 
identified (Benu Bidani and Martin Ravallion, 1997; Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong and Mark 
Wilson, 2004).  In addition, Kathleen Getz and Roger Volkema (2001) have shown that 
wealthier countries should, on average, have higher levels of human development.  Furthermore, 
Getz and Volkema (2001) have argued that wealthier countries tend to have more economic 
freedom.  Although not well documented in the literature, the adult literacy rate is expected to 
have a positive correlation with EF because countries with high levels of economic freedom are, 
on average, wealthier countries.  A higher degree of economic freedom is also expected to have a 
positive impact on life expectancy.  Furthermore, basic neoclassical economic theory suggests 
that many of the factors used in the calculation of the economic freedom index (e.g. property 
                                                        
24 Although 175 countries are used in the OLS regression for 2005 and 700 countries are used in the GLS 
regressions complete data was unavailable for each variable across all countries. Consequently, some countries are 
dropped from the regressions. This is reflected by in the smaller sample sizes in the regression outputs.  
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rights, business freedom, absence of regulation etc.) will be correlated with measurements of 
national wealth.   
Given the strong correlation between many of the independent variables, 
multicollinearity is of concern.  Therefore, a simple regression of corruption perception levels on 
human development and the control variables may be problematic.  As a result, a residual 
analysis is used to capture the unexplained relationship between HD and the control variables, as 
well as between EF and the control variables.  Therefore, the following two equations are used, 
where i represents individual countries in the sample at time t:  
 
 EFit = α0 + α1Lit + α2Hit + α3Yit + α4π it + α5OECDi + α6Ti + α7BCi + e1it                     (1) 
 HDit = β0 + β1Lit + β2Hit + β3Yit + β4π it + β5OECDi + β6Ti + β7BCi + e2it      (2) 
 
L represents the adult literacy rate, H represents life expectancy at birth, Y represents the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, π represents the inflation rate, OECD is 
a dummy variable for OECD membership, T is a dummy variable for countries located in 
tropical regions, and BC is a dummy variable for former British Colonies.   
The residuals (e1 and e2) from each regression are then predicted and defined as “EFhat” 
from equation (1) and “HDhat” from equation (2).  A correlation matrix with the residuals HDhat 
and EFhat, obtained from OLS regressions using data from years 2005-2007, is presented below: 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix (With Year 2000 Data Omitted) 
   EF      HD       L          H    Y          π  
  
EF             1.0000         
HD             0.5849        1.0000       
L             0.4227   0.8701      1.0000   
H               0.5104   0.9084      0.7000        1.0000 
Y               0.5882   0.8409      0.8409        0.7261          1.0000 
π              -0.4052      -0.3879     -0.2490       -0.3696  -0.4192           1.0000 
  
   EFhat      HDhat      L          H    Y    π  
  
EFhat             1.0000         
HDhat             0.1964        1.0000       
L            -0.0012  -0.0285      1.0000   
H              -0.0073  -0.0468      0.7000        1.0000 
Y             0.0102   0.0147      0.6336        0.7261          1.0000 
π             0.0110        0.0596     -0.2490       -0.3696  -0.4192           1.0000 
  
 
Because the focus of this study is to separately evaluate the impact of EF and HD on 
corruption, two separate models are constructed using the residuals from (1) and (2).  The first 
model attempts to capture the relationship between corruption and economic freedom using CP 
as the dependent variable and EFhat as the independent variable of concern.  The second model 
attempts to capture the relationship between corruption and human development using CP as the 
dependent variable and HDhat as the explanatory variable of interest.  The independent variables 
for adult literacy, wealth, health, inflation, OECD, tropics, and colonial history are included in 
both models as controls.  In order to develop the general specifications for the human 
development and economic freedom regressions, the residuals from (1) and (2) are incorporated 
into the two separate estimation equations presented below: 
 
 ˆ C Pi = ˆ γ 0 + ˆ γ1EFhatit + ˆ γ 2Lit + ˆ γ 3Hit + ˆ γ 4Yit + ˆ γ 5π it + ˆ γ 6OECDi + ˆ γ 7Ti + ˆ γ 8BCi    (3) 
 ˆ C Pi = ˆ δ 0 + ˆ δ 1HDhatit + ˆ δ 2Lit + ˆ δ 3Hit + ˆ δ 4Yit + ˆ δ 5π it + ˆ δ 6OECDi + ˆ δ 7Ti + ˆ δ 8BCi       (4)    
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The dependent variable CP represents the corruption perception scores for individual 
countries. Equation (3) uses the explanatory variable EFhat obtained from (1) to estimate the 
impact of human development on corruption perception, and equation (4) uses the explanatory 
variable HDhat obtained from (2).  Both use the same set of control variables as in equations (1) 
and (2).  Equations (3) and (4) are used in an OLS regression with 2005 data and several GLS 
panel regressions using all available data in an attempt to isolate the effects of HD and EF on CP.  
HDhat is expected to be statistically significant with a negative coefficient.  In other 
words, human development is expected to have an inverse relationship with corruption 
perception.  This expectation is consistent with previous literature that has documented an 
inverse relationship between corruption perceptions and human development (most notably in 
Akçay, 2006).  Y is expected to be statistically significant with a negative coefficient; an increase 
in wealth should reduce corruption perception as measured by the index.  H is expected to be 
statistically significant with a negative coefficient in the corruption regressions: countries with a 
higher life expectancy are expected to have lower levels of corruption as measured by the index.  
It has been demonstrated that corruption reduces government spending on education (Mauro, 
1998).  Since educational expenditures are assumed to be associated with higher adult literacy 
rates an inverse relationship between L and corruption is expected.  In addition, as individuals 
become more exposed to information about their political institutions they are more inclined to 
hold them accountable for their actions.  Countries with higher levels of π, all else equal, are 
expected to have higher levels of perceived corruption (see Getz and Volkema, 2001; Al-
Marhubi, 2000; Braun and DiTella, 2004; and Paldam, 2000).  Therefore, a positive coefficient 
on the inflation variable is expected.   
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Jeffrey Sachs (2001; 2003) showed that countries located in tropical regions have lower 
levels of economic development and per capita income.  Although a direct relationship between 
geographic location and corruption probably does not exist, it has been hypothesized that 
physical location acts as a proxy for economic development (Triesman 2000).  Since less corrupt 
countries have been shown to have higher levels of economic development and per capita 
income, on average, then underdeveloped, poor countries are expected to be more susceptible to 
corruption.   In other words, low economic development, not geographic location, is likely the 
source of corruption in these tropical countries.  Therefore, the coefficient on the tropics dummy 
is expected to be positive in corruption regressions.  OECD countries are committed to principles 
of democracy and market economy and boast relatively high levels of income, human 
development and economic freedom.  Given the evidence suggesting these variables are 
inversely related to corruption perception the coefficient on the OECD dummy is expected to be 
positive.  Finally, countries with British colonial heritage and legal systems were found to be less 
corrupt according to CPI measurements.  Consequently, the coefficient on the colonization 
dummy is expected to be negative such that 20th century British colonies are, on average, less 
corrupt. 
 
V. Estimation Results 
The first pair of regressions only uses year 2005 data. The purpose is to estimate the 
relationship between corruption, economic freedom and human development in a single year and 
determine the magnitude of the relationships prior to conducting the full panel studies.  The 
results from the OLS regressions using 2005 data are presented as Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 in 
the appendix. 
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Model 1 shows the results from a regression of CP on EFhat and the controls; Model 2 
shows the results from a regression of CP on HDhat and the controls.  The results from Table 3 
show that, with the exception of adult literacy, which is not statistically significant, all 
coefficients have the expected sign.  Although the variable for tropical location does have the 
expected sign in both models it is insignificant according to the associated p-value.  
Model 1 has an R2 of 0.7695 compared to 0.6923 from Model 2.  This suggests that EF 
explains nearly eight percent more of the variability in CP than does HD.  The coefficient on 
human development, however, is more negative than the coefficient on economic freedom.  This 
suggests that an increase in HD, on average, would have a greater impact on corruption 
perceptions than an increase of similar magnitude in EF in the year 2005.  A 20-point increase in 
HD, from that of Bolivia to Israel, for example, implies an average drop in CP of approximately 
3.12 points.  This drop in CP would reduce Bolivia’s corruption perception score to almost the 
same level as Uruguay.  Such a boost would move Bolivia, one of the most corrupt countries in 
the sample, to a spot among the thirty least corrupt countries.  The coefficient on the British 
Colony dummy from Model 1 suggests that, on average, countries with a recent history of British 
rule are less corrupt than others in the sample.  Finally the dummy variable for OECD 
membership indicates that an OECD country, on average, has a corruption perception score 
approximately 2 points lower than a non-OECD country holding other factors fixed.25  
The second set of models is associated with two panel studies using random-effects GLS 
regressions on EF and HD, once again using the residuals obtained in equations (1) and (2).  The 
results from the GLS regressions are presented as Models 3, 4, 5, and 6 in Table 4 in the 
appendix.  Because Models 3 and 5 incorporate year 2000 data the inflation variable was 
                                                        
25 It should be noted that most OECD countries have low inflation and high levels of human development, economic 
freedom, literacy, life expectancy and national wealth. 
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excluded from the random-effects GLS regression; therefore, results for the inflation variable do 
not appear.  Year 2000 data was excluded from Model 4 and 6 to incorporate the inflation 
variable.  Therefore, Models 4 and 6 estimate the impact of economic freedom and the control 
variables, including inflation, on corruption perception using data from years 2005, 2006 and 
2007.   
Model 3 shows the results from a panel study using data from years 2000, 2005, 2006 and 
2007.  With the exception of adult literacy and the tropics dummy, which are both statistically 
insignificant, all coefficients have the expected sign.  In Model 4, all coefficients have the 
expected sign except the coefficient for the statistically insignificant tropics dummy variable.  
Similar statistical results can be seen for Models 5 and 6 as well. 
 The R2 from Model 3 in the EF regression is greater than the R2 obtained from Model 5 in 
the HD regression.  This suggests that EF explains more of the variability in CP levels than HD 
in the panel study using data from 2000, 2005, 2006 and 2007.  Likewise, the results from the 
panel studies for years 2005, 2006, and 2007 suggest that EF is a better predictor of corruption 
than is HD.  These findings are consistent with the results found in the OLS regression using 
only year 2005 data.  However, the coefficient on HD is more than double the coefficient on 
economic freedom in both panel studies.  The average value of economic freedom in the larger 
panel study (Model 3) is 60.024.  If this average is multiplied by the coefficient from the 
corresponding regression analysis in Model 3 (-0.0455) a value of -2.731 is obtained.  If the 
same method is applied to human development a value of -9.406 is obtained (the average value 
from the appropriate sample, 73.035, multiplied by the corresponding coefficient of -0.1288).  
The value obtained from the human development calculation, -9.406 is more than three 
times the value obtained from the economic freedom calculation (-2.731).  This again suggests 
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that human development has a stronger impact on corruption, all else equal, confirming the 
original OLS estimation results.  Using the results obtained from Models 3 and 5, an increase of 
20 points in human development is associated with a 2.58-point reduction in corruption whereas 
a 20-point increase in economic freedom is associated with less than a one-point reduction (0.91) 
in corruption perception levels.   
Given the relatively weak relationship between the variables HDhat and EFhat26, a panel 
study that includes both variables in the same random-effects GLS regressions is presented in 
Models 7 and 8 in Table 4.  Model 8 presents the results from a GLS regression using only data 
collected for years 2005-2007.  Model 7 uses GLS regression and includes data obtained for year 
2000 as well; therefore, the inflation variable is excluded.  The coefficients in both models have 
the expected signs with the exception of the adult literacy variable and the tropics dummy, which 
are both statistically insignificant.  In addition, the R2 from both models is greater than 0.75.  
This suggests that either model explains more than 75% of the variability in perceived levels of 
corruption. 
These results imply that when measurements of human development and economic 
freedom are both added into a corruption perceptions regression, increases in human 
development have a greater impact on perceived levels of corruption.  The coefficient on human 
development from Model 8, for example, suggests that a 20-point increase in a country’s human 
development score corresponds to a 3.20-point drop in corruption perception levels, all else 
equal.  The coefficient on economic freedom from the same model, however, suggests that a 20-
point increase in economic freedom corresponds to a drop of only 0.732 in perceived levels of 
corruption.  This finding is consistent with the previous OLS and GLS models in the study.  
                                                        
26 The correlation between HDhat and EFhat is 0.208. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 This study examined the relationship between corruption perception and the independent 
variables human development and economic freedom in an attempt to determine which variable 
had more explanatory power using an innovative approach to isolate their independent features.  
The results obtained from the regression models used in this study suggest that levels of 
economic freedom and human development can be significant predictors of corruption 
perceptions in cross-country studies.  Moreover, the study suggests that although economic 
freedom may explain more of the variability in corruption perceptions across countries, increases 
in human development can, on average, lead to greater reductions in corruption perception 
levels.  
The results from Table 3 reveal a strong relationship between economic freedom, human 
development and corruption using data from a single year.  The results presented in Table 4 
demonstrate that these relationships hold when incorporated into panel studies using data from 
multiple years.  The models indicate that economic freedom explains more of the variation in 
corruption perception levels if measured by R2 values.  However, the coefficients from the 
models presented suggest that increases in human development can have a greater impact on 
corruption perception levels, all else equal.  As illustrated in Table 4 these implications continue 
to hold when expanded to panel studies and after both variables are included in the same 
corruption perceptions regression.   
These findings also have public policy implications.  First, increases in levels of human 
development, economic freedom, life expectancy and national wealth could potentially reduce 
levels of perceived corruption.  In addition, low inflation may also contribute to reductions in 
  20
corruption perception levels.  Although this may appear to be easier said than done, it does imply 
that developing nations committed to improving along these guidelines could have diminishing 
levels of corruption over time.  Second, increases in human development levels can, on average, 
be attributed to greater reductions in corruption perceptions than increases in economic freedom.  
Since economic freedom is essentially defined as an absence of bureaucracy and regulation, 
these results suggest that a reduction in the size and role of government may not always be the 
best course of action when tackling corruption problems.   
High levels of perceived corruption are the symptoms of low quality institutions.  It is 
possible that human development scores also act as a proxy for institutional quality.  This does 
not necessarily imply that increasing the relative size and regulatory power of the public sector 
will lead to decreases in corruption perception levels.  Many of the countries from the sample 
with high EF scores are relatively low HD scores have low levels of perceived corruption.  New 
Zealand, for example, has a very high EF score and a relatively low HD score yet it is tied with 
or listed as the least corrupt country for all years examined in this study.   
Future research efforts could be directed at including measurements of public 
expenditures on health and education instead of life expectancy and adult literacy since the latter 
are factored into a country’s HDI score.  Unfortunately, complete data sets with measures of 
social spending are not currently available for a cross-country study committed to a large sample 
size.  Since considerable investment in education and health is typically associated with a large 
public sector, including measures of social spending could offer additional insight into the 
relationship between human development and corruption.  Finally, additional measurements of 
institutional quality would be useful for future studies involving corruption perceptions.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
      n  Mean  Standard Deviation  
Year 2000   
 Adult Literacy    156  81.269  20.837 
Life Expectancy at birth   175  10.124  41.9 
 GDP Per Capita (PPP)   161  9417.228 462.81 
 Corruption Perception     88  5.213  2.402 
Human Development   154  70.951  17.905 
 Economic Freedom   154  58.642  11.572 
Year 2005   
 Adult Literacy    175  83.330  19.194 
Life Expectancy at birth   175  68.192  10.177 
 GDP Per Capita (PPP)   174  11292.04 12072.89 
Consumer Price Index   157  6.037  4.717 
 Corruption Perception   151  5.853  2.197 
Human Development   169  72.922  17.360 
 Economic Freedom   150  60.087  9.919 
Year 2006   
 Adult Literacy    175  83.580  18.918 
Life Expectancy at birth   175  68.465  10.106 
 GDP Per Capita (PPP)   171  12333.75 13000.69 
Consumer Price Index   141  6.269  4.654 
 Corruption Perception   157  5.882  2.161 
Human Development   175  73.673  17.259 
 Economic Freedom   152  60.584  9.884 
Year 2007    
 Adult Literacy    175  83.793  18.792 
Life Expectancy at birth   175  68.738  10.025 
 GDP Per Capita (PPP)   175  13076.58 13713.93 
Consumer Price Index   167  6.083  4.150 
 Corruption Perception   169  5.931  2.102 
Human Development   175  74.124  17.176 
 Economic Freedom   152  60.801  9.802 
Total    
 Adult Literacy    681  83.041  19.394 
Life Expectancy at birth   700  68.086  10.110 
 GDP Per Capita (PPP)   683  11390.78 12271.56 
Consumer Price Index   465  6.124  4.493 
 Corruption Perception   565  5.785  2.201 
Human Development   655  73.035  17.397 
 Economic Freedom   608  60.024  10.336 
 
Note: Inflation data for Year 2000 was unavailable.  
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Table 3: OLS Regression of Corruption Perception on Economic Freedom and Human Development (2005) 
Coefficient:      Model 1  Model 2    
Economic Freedom Index (EFhat) 
Coefficient:     -0.1117***    
P-value:      0.000     
Human Development (HDhat) 
Coefficient:        -0.1562***  
P-value:        0.000  
Adult Literacy (% aged 15 and older) 
Coefficient:     0.0017   0.0009  
P-value:      0.822  0.912   
Life Expectancy at Birth 
Coefficient:     -0.0717*** -0.0607***  
P-value:      0.000  0.001   
Natural Log of GDP Per Capita (PPP)   
Coefficient:     -0.3333*** -0.3029**   
P-value:      0.007  0.013   
Inflation        
Coefficient:     0.0670** 0.0497**  
P-value:      0.019  0.081  
OECD Membership  
Coefficient:     -2.3704*** -2.4773***   
P-value:      0.000  0.000   
Tropics  
Coefficient:     0.0488  0.2984  
P-value:      0.833  0.251  
British Colony 
Coefficient:     -1.0992*** -0.7674*** 
P-value:      0.000  0.005   
 
R2       .7695  .6923    
F       52.59  36.28 
N       135  138   
Note: 
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level 
Table 4: Random Effects GLS regression of Corruption Perception on EF, HD and Controls27 
Coefficient:    Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
Economic Freedom (EFhat) 
Coefficient:   -0.0455*** -0.0470***     -0.0395*** -0.0366*** 
P-value:    0.000  0.000      0.000  0.000 
Human Development (HDhat) 
Coefficient:       -0.1288*** -0.1749*** -0.1079*** -0.1601*** 
P-value:        0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Adult Literacy (% aged 15 and older) 
Coefficient:   0.0029   -0.0044  0.0071  -0.0034  0.0036  -0.0002 
P-value:    0.577  0.524  0.185  0.963  0.470  0.966 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
Coefficient:   -0.0838*** -0.0868*** -0.0673*** -0.0581*** -0.0629*** -0.0565*** 
P-value:    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Natural Log of GDP Per Capita (PPP)   
Coefficient:   -0.1623*** -0.1084*** -0.3951*** -0.5236*** -0.4441*** -0.5442*** 
P-value:    0.000  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Inflation        
Coefficient:     0.0213**   0.0213***   0.0332*** 
P-value:      0.012    0.003    0.000 
OECD Membership  
Coefficient:   -2.2212*** -1.9505*** -1.9979*** -1.6246*** -2.1588*** -1.8199*** 
P-value:    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Tropics  
Coefficient:   -0.1157  -0.2923  -0.0969  -0.2673  -.1175  -0.2239 
P-value:    0.561  0.159  0.644  0.209  0.541  0.235 
British Colony 
Coefficient:   -0.8687*** -0.8164*** -0.5335** -0.4128* * -0.7861*** -0.6835*** 
P-value:    0.000  0.000  0.018  0.071  0.000  0.001 
 
R2     .7093  .7070  .6820  .6685  .7558  .7539 
Wald     417.38  340.88  319.45  307.50  482.07  447.04 
N     524  416  552  440  512  412 
Note:*Significant at the 10% level;**Significant at the 5% level;***Significant at the 1% level 
                                                        
27 It should be noted that, unlike Models 4, 6 and 8 the results from Models 3, 5 and 7 are not obtained using the general specifications presented in (2) and (4). 
Because Models 3, 5 and 7 incorporate year-2000 data, which does not include inflation data, the inflation variable from (2) and (4) is dropped from the OLS 
equation used to estimate the residuals EFhat and HDhat. 
